Description

In this novel approach to metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and philosophical logic, Franz Huber explores means-end derivations of the logics of default conditionals and counterfactuals, modal idealism about possible worlds, and the royal rule, a normative principle relating descriptive normality to conditional belief.

Causality, Counterfactuals, and Belief develops typicality and causality models, allowing for characterizations of backtracking and causal counterfactuals, generalizations of structural equations and causal models, definitions of hard and soft interventions, as well as conditions under which counterfactuals and default conditionals can be tested.

Distinct in its unifying methodological approach, Huber's exploration of means-end philosophy -- together with a critical discussion of the use of intuition in philosophy -- posits the discipline as both serious and normative, arguing that philosophical problems are deeply intertwined with one other. It explains the importance of logic to philosophy without identifying logic as a technical theory in itself.

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