Description

Increasingly, former members of Congress are finding their way back into the corridors of power representing the very interest groups they once regulated. This post-congressional lobbying activity has proven to be very lucrative for many ex-lawmakers. As lobbyists, former members of Congress carry significant clout that gives them access not only to their former colleagues in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, but also to members of the executive branch. While generally the practice of walking through the "revolving door" has been discussed as unseemly, a bigger danger is that members of Congress might sponsor legislation that benefits their future employers.

This book looks at the question of whether members of Congress reward their future employers with public policy. The book evaluates the extent to which former members of Congress become lobbyists, and the implications of this career choice on pubic policy. Of concern is whether or not members of Congress with post-congressional lobbying ambitions are using their positions to maximize the interests of those they plan to serve once they leave office. The evidence will show that lawmakers who become lobbyists not only behave differently in the legislative arena than those who do not become lobbyists, but also lobby on behalf of the very interests they once regulated in Congress.

The book begins with a discussion on the intentions of the framers of the Constitution to constrain ambition. It then proceeds to show who becomes a lobbyist and how post-congressional lobbyists exploit their relationships with their former colleagues as they lobby on behalf of special interests. The book concludes by suggesting that post-congressional lobbying not only has the potential to undermine sound public policy, it also has the potential to jeopardize the legitimacy of the institution.