Description

This book investigates the consequences of redundant state and federal environmental regulations in the United States. Drawing on the most exhaustive statistical analysis of US federal wetland permits ever constructed, the book uncovers the disjointed world of wetland regulation. The author starts by examining the socioeconomic and environmental factors driving individuals to apply for environmental regulatory permits and the regional inconsistencies encountered in federal environmental regulatory program performance. The book goes on to demonstrate that states have more power in federal relationships than scholars often believe and that individual state policies are important even in a time of strong federal governance. Evidence shows that such intergovernmental redundancy serves to increase overall regulatory program effectiveness.

This book breaks new ground in the subjects of federalism and environmental regulation by rejecting the traditional approach of picking winners and losers in favour of a nuanced demonstration of how redundancy and collaboration between different levels of governance can make for more effective governmental programs. The book is also innovative in its use of the perspectives of regulated citizens not as a point of judgment, but as a means of introducing a constructive new way of thinking about political and administrative boundaries within a federalist system of governance. The book provides relevant context to wider political debates about excessive and duplicative regulatory oversight and will be of interest to Environmental Policy students and administrators.