Description

In many situations, there is not a single action we ought to do, but rather a range of permissible options from which we can choose. Although this normative latitude arises in countless decisions - from minor choices to those that profoundly shape our lives - existing philosophical accounts have not adequately captured its prevalence and significance. As the first book-length treatment of the subject, this monograph seeks to offer a comprehensive theory of normative latitude. Its central claim is that latitude frequently arises when the reasons for and against different options stand in a special comparative relation called parity. The book demonstrates that parity is far more widespread than previously recognized and identifies several overlooked conditions under which parity emerges. It also explores how an agent's epistemic perspective and the diachronic structure of decision-making are crucial to explaining why latitude is so prevalent. Overall, the book provides novel insights into the normative structure of our practical decision-making and will appeal to anyone interested in theories of practical rationality, normative reasons, and the philosophy of action.