Description

This study explores the intersection of moral luck and Christian theology by advancing and developing a counterfactual solution to the problem of moral luck.

As originally offered by Michael Zimmerman, we are morally responsible in virtue of not only what we do, but also what we would have done in non-actual circumstances. This solution carries two significant metaphysical commitments: true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom (the bedrock of molinist accounts of providence) and a haecceity view of personal identity. The resulting account of responsibility eliminates all (the standard) forms of moral luck and connects the agent's moral status to a particular species of control. This study then examines the nature of that control and the standard objections to a luck-free account of responsibility, and it explores how it is that we are oriented morally to the luck-bound world around us. These findings are then applied to the Christian theological framework, explaining how it is that all human persons may be inescapably and deeply culpable-suffering from original sin-in a way that is consistent with God's justice and love, and how they yet remain capable of a kind of moral restoration. The project then considers how we might be saved by divine grace and enjoy a kind of heavenly libertarian freedom, while exploring both old and new avenues for Christian theology.