Description

This book meticulously analyses fifty years of structural innovation in UK public management reform. Rather than ascribing failures and fiascos in policymaking to the ascendency of New Public Management, the book concentrates on how the rise of managerialism led to dilemmas and contradictions given the traditions and culture of British government. It addresses the dynamic of waves of centralisation and fragmentation, the back-and-forth between 'filling-in' and 'hollowing-out', that animated the public management reform process in Britain in the context of the adoption of NPM-style programmes.

Since the 1970s, it is acknowledged that public management reform had unforeseen results. Organisational changes paved the way for improved outcomes and greater responsiveness, while there were marked improvements in the performance and impact of policy programmes. Yet, what also emerged was a dysfunctional politics of accountability and reform. While decision-making was increasingly centralised, the centre of government remained weak and brittle. The landscape of public sector delivery was increasingly fragmented and disaggregated. Paradoxically, Ministers sought to exert increased control, but were invariably thwarted by the erosion of administrative capacity at the centre.

In the post-war era, the myth prevailed that UK institutions, practices and policies offered a template for the rest of the world, while there was little meaningful that could be learnt from elsewhere. What recent governing crises, notably Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic have taught us, is that despite decades of reform, the performance of the British state and public services is too often underwhelming. There has been less tangible improvement in efficiency, economy or effectiveness than might otherwise have been anticipated. This volume asks why that is so.