Description

Sir Edward Grey was the Liberal Foreign Secretary [1905-16], the longest continuous post holder in British history and arguably, through his foreign policy, was instrumental in Britain's entry into the First World War. The decision for war, whilst exercised by a nominal Liberal Cabinet, was considered by his own Liberal Party critics to be a failure of policy. This book, relying on relatively newly archived material for the first time in over fifty years, challenges certain historiographical assumptions surrounding the way colleagues within his own party endeavoured to bring about a directional change of policy. Whilst several leading scholars have dealt with Anglo-German foreign policy, drawing on new research, this book identifies and carries out a detailed evaluation of the criticisms to establish justification for Grey's policy. The argument will be presented that the activities of the so-called 'Liberal Radicals' laid the foundation stones for a complete change in the way that foreign policy was carried out after the cessation of conflict and that no longer was Britain's foreign policy in the hands of the few but became fundamentally within the control of the parliamentary structure. This book will be useful reading for those who are interested in Edwardian Liberal Politics.