Description

This volume brings together leading scholars from the phenomenological tradition to address questions regarding the relation of social ontology and phenomenology.

There is a longstanding suspicion in analytic philosophy that phenomenology cannot contribute to our understanding of social relations, dynamics, and institutions. The main reason for this suspicion lies in phenomenology's first-person perspective, whereas work on social reality in the analytic tradition tends to proceed from an outside, third-person standpoint. This volume makes the case that phenomenology's methodological emphasis on subjectivity and intersubjectivity can contribute to debates in social ontology. The chapters are divided into two thematic parts. Part 1 offers different broad methodological reflections on thinking about the social world from a phenomenological standpoint in general. Part 2 picks out different aspects of the social world to reflect on the question what specifically phenomenological approaches to these aspects have to offer. These chapters explore topics such as dignity, emotions, psychopathology, sexism, social norms, and trust.

Social Ontology and Phenomenology will be of interest to philosophers working in phenomenology, social ontology, and social philosophy.