Description

Compared to our appreciation of the epistemology of the sciences and mathematics, we have a relatively poor understanding of the epistemology of logic. This Element highlights three causes of this lack of progress: (i) failure to distinguish between the epistemology of logical theorising and that of good (logical) reasoning; (ii) hesitancy to base epistemology of logic on how logicians actually justify their logics, rather than our own presumptions about logic; and (iii) a presumption that the epistemology of logic must be significantly different to other research areas, such as the recognised sciences. The Element ends by highlighting what can be achieved by avoiding these pitfalls, presenting an account of theory-choice in logic, logical predictivism, motivated by actual logical practice, which suggests that the mechanisms of theory-choice in logic are not that different to those in the recognised sciences. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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